Passed Veto Override of Awards Act

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Asdersland

I am thou, and thou art I
Junior Administrator
Oct 2, 2020
247
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Awards
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Nation
Asdersland
My fellow Senators,

I have chosen to contest the Awards Act as vetoed by the President. For reference, here is the bill as has duly passed the Legislature:


Coat_of_Arms_UDS.png


A MOTION

To enact the bill "Establishment and Standardization of Awards & Other Grantable Items"
Introduced into the General Assembly of the Union of Democratic States on the 10th of April, 2021, by Phoenix
As follows:


BELIEVING that awards and ways of honoring Unionists are thriving,
CONTENDING that this is good for regional growth on a culture and community level,
BE IT ENACTED by the Senate and General Assembly:


Section 1: Definitions and Short Title
1. This Act may be referenced as the "Awards Act of 2021"

2. For the purposes of this act:
a. "Categories" shall be defined as "a place on the regional forums in which multiple boards are stored."
b. "Buildings" shall be defined as "a place on the regional forums inside of a category, known as a board."
c. "Establishing authority" shall be defined as "the head of the branch of government in which the award in question came from."

Section 2: Provisions
1. Establishment of an award shall be vested solely in the head of a currently active government branch.
a. This authority may be delegated to lower-ranked individuals inside the said branch.
b. Any currently established and future award must have a description, that includes the requirements to obtain the award and who may bestow it. Such a description must be publicly posted in the said branch's forums.
c. The Presidential Awards for Service must retain their current description as defined in Section 3.1 of this Act. These descriptions may be added on to, but not removed from what is stated in the Section.

2. The establishment of other grantable items, such as; statuses, or infrastructure renaming (which must be limited to Categories and/or "Buildings") shall only be vested solely in the Senate of the Union through a Motion, which must be signed off on by the President.
a. A member of the General Assembly may introduce a recommendation to the Senate to consider, and if agreed by three Senators, be permitted to introduce with the Senator introducing it.
b. Statuses given to a citizen of the Union may only be ceremonial, and may NOT be vested any authority. In addition, any rights or privileges may not heighten the influence of these Unionists, but solely as an award for dedication, hard work, etcetera.

3. The modification of an award must be approved by the establishing authority, or who they delegate.
a. Modifications must coincide with the requirements to establish an award and cannot deviate.
b. Modifications must be presented in a forum thread, detailing the changes and why.

4. The retirement of an award shall be vested solely in the head of a branch, which may not be delegated.
a. Retirement shall not mean the deletion of any data pertaining to that award or the stripping of said award from a user.
b. Should an award lose its establishing branch of government, that award will be under the discretion of the Executive to retire.

5.The removal of an award or status is bestowed in the establishing authority, or who they delegate.
a. Removal of an award from a group or individual requires a forum thread detailing why.
b. Removal cannot be due to personal disagreement, political sabotage of a person's reputation, or the loss of citizenship.
c. Removal can only occur if the person committed a crime and was found guilty, the person or group willingly wishes to forfeit the award, or the requirements to obtain the said award have drastically changed.

Section 3: References

1. Presidential Service Medals descriptions:
a. The Original concept of the First Class Service Medal was derived from a former Executive Order eight made by former Prime Minister Thatcher Whitehall in December of 2019. The First Class Service Medal is now awarded to current Citizens who provided overwhelmingly extensive service and leadership to the Union.

b. The Original concept of the Second Class Service Medal was derived from a former Executive Order eight made by former Prime Minister Thatcher Whitehall in December of 2019. The Second Class Service Medal is now awarded to current Citizens who provided extensive service and leadership to the Union.

c. The Original concept of the Third Class Service Medal was derived from a former Executive Order eight made by former Prime Minister Thatcher Whitehall in December of 2019. The Third Class Service Medal is now awarded to current Citizens who provided good service and leadership to the Union.


And then the objection stated by the President:


After some heavy reviewing, I have come to the conclusion that I will be vetoing this bill.

While I am not obligated to give my rationale for vetoing, I wish to anyways so I may explain why I believe this in the best interest of the Union. After looking over the Attorney General's response to the bill's legality, especially concerning the clause concerning the legislature's ability, I believe that having any part of the bill cause ambiguity and controversy about its constitutionality is more than enough to warrant a veto to allow for an amendment to fix the problematic clauses. Furthermore, as many have noted a new constitution on the way makes this controversy moot, as the bill will be amended to deal with the new legislature. To this, I say vetoing the bill makes even more sense. Rather than having to amend the law to comply with the new constitution, I would recommend the legislature amend the problematic clause to allow it to be vague enough to work with either our current or upcoming constitution so that we won't have to amend it in the first place.

I understand the frustration this may cause, considering the long journey this bill has gone through and its minor importance, but I believe that to allow this bill to go through into becoming law knowing there is a constitutionally vague clause would not be proper as a president, and I believe that with new enthusiasm, this bill can and will be amended and re-approved again rather quickly, where I will be more than happy to sign it into law. Until then, my veto stands as my own proper decision.


With that I will open debate as well as state the case for the veto override.
 
For obvious reasons, I do not support the override of this veto. Firstly, I believe the constitutional concerns with the bill are legitimate and must be properly addressed. To summarize my reasoning for saying this bill presents constitutional issues:

  1. As has long been established, the individual houses of the Legislature have an independent right to establish their own rules.
  2. Furthermore, this power is considered to be at the exclusion of the Legislature.`
  3. If there is no overriding legislative purpose for a bill establishing a rule, then it may not.
Furthermore, this bill would need to be amended to make sense under the new constitution anyways, as the reference to "General Assembly" in the clause in question would be construed to mean the Senate, making the bill nonsensical. Suggesting that this would be fixed under the archival clause would be tenuous at best. How the "construing" plays out legally is unsure but properly done, this bill would not need that treatment. Under the new Constitution, this would not run afoul of the self-governance clauses, but would create a bizarre parallel system of legislation, similar but not exactly like the Constitution's. I suggest not overriding the veto and instead re-proposing the bill with the offending section replaced with:

Other grantable items, such as statuses or the renaming of Categories or Buildings, may be granted after a Motion is passed by the Legislature to this effect and is assented to by the President.
I say this rhetorically, not procedurally, in order to demonstrate that overriding this veto is the foolish and anti-pragmatic path.
 
I see the legal conflicts this creates. After deliberating on this, I feel that, in the current legislative climate, the appropriate action in this instance would be to override the Presidential veto, then amend the enacted law where needed to resolve the conflicts, rather than to go through the process of re-enacting an amended law, in a legislature which is potentially facing an imminent overhaul. It's been a longstanding thing that precedent isn't particularly meaningful in the legislature, so we can reasonably afford to resolve this in this manner. It's not ideal, but I posit that such a method is the most ideal out of all currently available options.
 
The case for the veto override

The case of the veto revolves around the issue of Section 2, 2.a:

A member of the General Assembly may introduce a recommendation to the Senate to consider, and if agreed by three Senators, be permitted to introduce with the Senator introducing it.

This clause was misrepresented by Attorney General Glaciosia to mean that the bill was regulating the procedures of the Senate in a manner inconsistent with Article 4, Section 1.2 of the Constitution, specifically the bolded portion:

Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings and may, by a procedural motion passed by a two thirds majority, discipline or expel a member for violating these rules.

This was based on Glaciosia's interpretation of a Legal Question answer by the judiciary, specifically this one. This is a fairly benign Legal Question, mostly based on the thought that there would be multiple cases in which a Rule of Procedure would interfere with a law and vice-versa. It is certainly suitable for answering the question. Unfortunately, the interpretation taken by the Attorney General appears to be that this is a very literal instead of nuanced LQ response, and that under no circumstances can a law regulate the legislature.

We must of course first consider the logical implications of this conclusion. By implying that a law--passed by the legislature, no less!--is unconstitutional because it infringes on the right of each house to determine the rules of procedure is absurd from a logical standpoint. The legislature is outright giving its consent to the regulation; to claim that the Legislature's rights are being violated is tantamount to stating that the Executive and Judiciary know how to run the Legislature better than the Legislature itself.

Now, to synthesize the logical and legal arguments. This is not a rule of procedure, so it cannot be that other entities are imposing rules of procedure on the Senate. Furthermore, even if this were true, the "rule" made by this bill does not impose on the Senate in any capacity. The introduction procedure provided for by this bill require a majority of Senators--thus a majority of the body being imposed upon and the same majority required to amend the body's rules of procedure anyways.

And to address the remaining legal arguments: in the opinion, the Attorney General cited the Legal Question's key findings, namely:

1). The Senate and General Assembly are self-regulating institutions.
2). Rules of Procedure are not self-enforcing, and may be deviated from; except where law stipulates otherwise.
3). Laws may not overrule the self-regulation of each institution mentioned in the constitution.
4). Rules of Procedures are, generally, inferior to laws and will be overruled by law.

The Attorney General's claim relies on a view of this LQ, the Constitution, and the bill that in the words of the Chief Justice:

...is so overly simplistic and unilateral that it would nuke the entire foundations of respectable government. The necessary dividing line between self-regulation and inferiority of self-regulations is to prevent the Legislature from creating a Committee that would pick Ministers and steal that power from the President, not that it prevents any law being made on any other function of government.
(She offers a separate and rhetorical hypothetical case in which this clause of the constitution would matter).

The Chief Justice makes clear that

The crossover between [the points made in the LQ], and especially 3. and 4. is that "self-regulation" is a limited term and does not apply to every thing a branch of government can deliberate on itself. This leaves ample room for further things to be given to each branch of government as well as the stipulations that each branch must follow in circumstances. Typically, these circumstances will be when other facets of the constitution get involved.

That is to say, not everything that involves the legislature is even self-regulation to begin with. That would be, again, absurd.

There is a clear need for this law to set out "procedure"--namely that without this being in place the legislature would have to wait for Senate rules to be created on the matter instead to create new procedure. This bill is a simple, practical, and constitutional solution to a problem. If we must amend it, so be it. It is not the end of the world.

To the argument against vetoing and instead re-proposing: As a point of honor, I believe the Legislature must reject the attempts of the Executive to govern the Legislature as it sees fit using its veto power. This is inappropriate interference and must be strongly condemned by the Legislature by overriding the veto.

In summary of the arguments: This bill does not create self-regulation; even if it did, it has been consented to by the Senate and the Legislature; even if it had not been consented to, the bill does not establish a procedure that cannot be overruled by the Senate itself; there is a compelling interest for this clause to exist in this bill; and in general, the argument used to have this bill vetoed relies on a paternalistic view of the Legislature by the executive that also violates the spirit of the Constitutional provision being cited.
 
I see the legal conflicts this creates. After deliberating on this, I feel that, in the current legislative climate, the appropriate action in this instance would be to override the Presidential veto, then amend the enacted law where needed to resolve the conflicts, rather than to go through the process of re-enacting an amended law, in a legislature which is potentially facing an imminent overhaul. It's been a longstanding thing that precedent isn't particularly meaningful in the legislature, so we can reasonably afford to resolve this in this manner. It's not ideal, but I posit that such a method is the most ideal out of all currently available options.
This just makes no sense to me. Is there some imminent awards emergency? What collapse is immanentized by us daring to re-examine an overlooked clause of a bill to make it better?

The Speaker argues that this provision , which explicitly sets out the process of debate and introduction for a motion, is somehow, magically not a rule of procedure. This position boggles the mind. If that is not a rule of procedure, then literally every single measure of our current Senate Rules could be excluded.

A further point is that beyond the constitutional issue, by excising some matters of internal regulation and procedure into the various far flung corners of the law, we create the worlds largest organization headache. When can a sponsor of a motion speak? Well if its a bill, then you look at the rules of procedures. But if we are renaming a forum category, you'll need to dig into the minutiae of the Union's law archives to discover what arcane and discontinious rule was established for this motion. It is inelegant, unnecessary and creates havoc for any future Senators. There is literally no point to doing this: the Senate's rules are sufficiently flexible to deal with this as a motion as set forth in its rules and our constitution.
 
This just makes no sense to me. Is there some imminent awards emergency? What collapse is immanentized by us daring to re-examine an overlooked clause of a bill to make it better?

The Speaker argues that this provision , which explicitly sets out the process of debate and introduction for a motion, is somehow, magically not a rule of procedure. This position boggles the mind. If that is not a rule of procedure, then literally every single measure of our current Senate Rules could be excluded.

A further point is that beyond the constitutional issue, by excising some matters of internal regulation and procedure into the various far flung corners of the law, we create the worlds largest organization headache. When can a sponsor of a motion speak? Well if its a bill, then you look at the rules of procedures. But if we are renaming a forum category, you'll need to dig into the minutiae of the Union's law archives to discover what arcane and discontinious rule was established for this motion. It is inelegant, unnecessary and creates havoc for any future Senators. There is literally no point to doing this: the Senate's rules are sufficiently flexible to deal with this as a motion as set forth in its rules and our constitution.
I mean, it's pretty obvious that it's not a rule of procedure. No one titled it a rule, no one said it was a rule, and most importantly it is not a rule.

It's law, which as established can override rules of procedure; and as for the issue of separating the "rules", this isn't the first time this has been done--as shown by Druing with UL 1, 2, and 22, as well as, ironically, the Constitution, which sets out much of the procedure for the legislature.
 
as well as, ironically, the Constitution, which sets out much of the procedure for the legislature.
The Constitution is the supreme legal authority and therefore, it wouldn't be unreasonable for it to supersede itself.
 
The Constitution is the supreme legal authority and therefore, it wouldn't be unreasonable for it to supersede itself.
You are absolutely correct. My point is that it is but one example of a document setting rules outside of the Senate-specific rules.
 
As I said in discord:

UL 1 deals with issues of the legislative process as a whole, with issues which could not reasonably be addressed within each house
It serves a legitimate legislative purpose (ensuring laws follow a specific and standard format)
While the awards acts provisions establishing rules both strike at the heart of the idea of "rules and procedures" (ie. Setting the process for who can speak and when within the senate specifically) and do so without a compelling purpose
The provisions of the law could easily and reasonably be a part of the rules of procedure
The law just randomly and pointlessly shoves a rule on debate into the law for no reason

I will again point to UL-17 as the example which does basically what this law wants to do without establishing a rule.


I mean, it's pretty obvious that it's not a rule of procedure. No one titled it a rule, no one said it was a rule, and most importantly it is not a rule.
I think you're relying on the "if it doesn't have a sign on it calling it a duck, and no one calls it a duck out loud, its not a duck" system of rule classification here which is quite silly. The more important question is whether this rule , order, direction, etc is "of its proceedings" ie. whether the rule is internal to the Senate, and whether they are related to the procedural aspects of the process. This is about who can speak and when in the senate's halls, clearly related to procedure.
 
While I personally don’t believe the clause in question to be unconstitutional( a question that we could leave to the Supreme Court to delibarate, but I’d rather not) there is the question of whether the clause is necessery, and considering the lacking urgency of getting an awards Act passed immidetely I cannot clearly see the reasoning behind a veto override
 
The last thing I would like to say is that if you believe this clause is constitutional, it is imperative to vote for this. We cannot send the message to the executive that wanton regulation of the Legislature's affairs by the Executive is permissible. This proceeding is the reexamination; it is clear this clause is legitimate from the debate.

With that, the 48 hour debate period has concluded. We will now take a vote on overriding the veto.
 
Nay, this act is constitutionally and legally problematic. Overriding the veto will be a childish exercise antithetical to our duties as legislation.
 
After much deliberation, I have not found conclusive evidence that it is strictly unconstutional and must then honor my original vote by voting aye
 
Aye - It's more constructive to resolve minor issues via amendment than to throw out the entire text because of them.
 
Aye.

With four votes in favor, one against, the Senate vote has reached the supermajority necessary to override the President's veto. The bill will now move to the Assembly for deliberation.
 
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